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// smart-contract forensics · EVM

Read the code.
Map the keys.
Grade the risk.

A read-only forensic review of EVM contracts: who controls them, which privileged functions they expose and what a controller could do to holders, with every finding ranked by severity and the contract graded A to F.

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F28/100
Smart-contract security audit · Ethereum · 2026-10-14 09:12Vault (VLT) 0x7f3a9c…a1c20
CRITICAL 1HIGH 3MEDIUM 2LOW 1
Findings (7)
  • CRITICALController can pull tokens from wallets that approved this contract
  • HIGHController can replace the contract logic
  • HIGHController can move assets held by the contract
  • HIGHController can mint new tokens
  • MEDIUMController can switch trading or transfers off
Who controls it
RoleAddressWhat it is
Owner0x9a3f…11feWallet (single key)
Proxy admin0x9a3f…11feSame wallet as the owner
Minter0x4c81…07e0Safe · 3 of 5

Automated findings are review leads for an investigator, not legal conclusions.

Where it reads from

Every fact is fetched
at the time of the audit.

Read from the chainLivestate, not a cached copy
  • Account type: contract, clone, proxy or EIP-7702 wallet
  • Proxy slots resolved, so the logic contract is the one audited
  • Owner, admin, role members, pause state and supply
Read from the codeSourceor the bytecode when there is none
  • Verified source from the explorer, Sourcify or Blockscout, or source you paste
  • Your project’s code only; standard libraries are left out
  • Unverified contracts: public functions decoded from the bytecode
Not coveredGapslisted in the report
  • Networks with no RPC answer or no deployment record
  • Non-EVM networks: chain-record review only
  • Every source used is named at the foot of the report
What it checks

What we look for,
and how serious it is.

CriticalPull tokens from approvers

transferFrom() on an address the caller chooses: anyone who approved the contract can be emptied.

CriticalRewrite holder balances

Balances written directly, outside the normal transfer path.

CriticalStop holders selling

A transfer check the owner can switch on for sells into the trading pair: the honeypot pattern.

CriticalOpen initialiser

An initialise function with no guard, so whoever calls it can make themselves owner.

CriticalAnyone can destroy it

selfdestruct, or delegatecall to a caller-supplied address, with no access check.

CriticalSell simulation fails

An independent buy-and-sell test could buy the token but not sell it.

HighReplace the contract logic

Upgrade functions or a proxy admin that can swap the code after you read it.

HighMove contract-held assets

Withdraw, rescue, sweep or emergency functions open to the controller.

HighMint without a cap

New supply the controller can create; drops to medium when a cap is enforced.

HighRaise fees without limit

Fee changes with no upper bound; drops to low when a bound is checked.

HighBlock named holders

Blacklists, bot lists and freezes on individual addresses.

HighRun arbitrary calls

The contract can be made to call or delegatecall any target.

HighReentrancy

ETH sent before storage is updated, with no reentrancy guard.

HighAuthorisation by tx.origin

An access check a malicious contract can borrow from the owner.

HighRenounce that isn’t

renounceOwnership() overridden so the owner is never actually removed.

HighSource not verified

No published source; the functions are decoded from the bytecode instead.

HighDrainer-shaped bytecode

Not a token, yet it moves other people’s tokens or batches calls.

HighOne key in control

A powerful role held by an ordinary wallet, an EIP-7702 delegated wallet or a 1-of-n Safe.

MediumSwitch trading off

Pause or trading toggles the controller can flip.

MediumChange transaction limits

Max-transaction, max-wallet or cooldown settings that can block sells.

MediumRedirect the router

The swap router or pair can be pointed somewhere else.

MediumUnchecked low-level call

A failed payment treated as success.

MediumWeak signature checks

ecrecover() without a zero-address or replay check.

MediumLiquidity not locked

No lock among the liquidity holders, so it can be pulled at any time.

LowFloating compiler version

The build cannot be reproduced exactly from the pragma.

LowChange the fee wallet

Where fees go can be changed; each recipient is a cash-out lead.

LowHand-written assembly

Inline assembly that writes storage or makes calls.

Each finding names the function, file and line where it was found, the guard on it and a next step. If ownership has been renounced and the contract cannot be upgraded, owner-only powers drop one level.

Control map

Who holds the keys,
read from the chain.

Each privileged role is matched to the address that holds it, and each address is identified as a single wallet, a Safe and its threshold, a timelock and its delay, or another contract. A single wallet behind a powerful role is a finding in itself.

Vault0x7f…c20 · proxy
Owner0x9a…11fSingle wallet
Proxy admin0x9a…11fSame wallet as the owner
Minter role0x4c…7e0Safe · 3 of 5
Pauser0x9a…11fSingle wallet
Pending owner0x51…b02Transfer in progress
Fee controller0x2d…a93Timelock · 48h

Here one wallet is owner, proxy admin and pauser, so a single key could upgrade, pause and drain.

Addresses to follow

From the contract
to the people behind it.

The audit lists every address worth tracing next and checks each one against public scam blocklists. When you keep the report, you choose which addresses to add to the case as leads.

Vault 0x7f…c206 addresses to follow · each screened against blocklists
  1. 1Deployer

    Sent the creation transaction

    0x3e…7d1
  2. 2Funded the deployer

    First money into the deployer wallet

    0xb2…40a
  3. 3Implementation

    The logic contract behind the proxy

    0x88…c5e
  4. 4Controllers

    Owner, proxy admin and role holders

    0x9a…11f
  5. 5Safe signers

    Each signer behind a multisig role

    5 wallets
  6. 6Largest holder

    A wallet holding a large share of supply

    0x6f…e19
What the report holds

One report,
ready for the case.

01Grade and summary

The A–F grade and score, the count of findings at each severity, and a few lines on who controls the contract and how.

02Findings

Each finding has its severity, what it means, the code it came from and the next step to take.

03Control and functions

Who controls it, every privileged function and its guard, the deployment record, the largest holders and the functions decoded from the bytecode.

04Sources and limits

What was read and from where, and anything that could not be checked.

Not a pre-launch audit.This is forensic review for incidents, integrations and investigations. For new code before deployment, commission a formal security audit.
Grade a contract before you depend on it.Owners, proxy admins and privileged functions mapped in one run.
Questions

From security
and legal teams.

Something else? Ask our team →

01

Which chains are supported?

EVM networks. Everything is read live from the contract’s own network; other networks get the chain-record review only.

02

What if the source code isn’t verified?

That is itself a high finding. The audit still disassembles the bytecode, names the public functions it can and lists the administrative ones, so you can see what the contract exposes.

03

How is the grade worked out?

Each finding takes points off 100: 25 for critical, 12 for high, 5 for medium and 1 for low. Any critical finding caps the score at 39. A is 90 or more, then B 75, C 60, D 40, otherwise F.

04

Is a finding proof that the contract was used to steal?

No. A finding shows what the code allows. Each one carries a next step, such as which events or transactions to pull, so an investigator can check whether it was actually used.

05

Does this replace a security audit?

No. It is forensic review for incidents, integrations and investigations. For new code before launch, commission a formal audit.

06

Does anything get saved without me?

No. The audit writes nothing until you keep it. Kept reports go to the case with their findings, controllers and leads; undecided ones are deleted after 72 hours.

Bring us the contract
and the address.

We’ll grade it, map who controls it and list the addresses to follow with you.