- Account type: contract, clone, proxy or EIP-7702 wallet
- Proxy slots resolved, so the logic contract is the one audited
- Owner, admin, role members, pause state and supply
Read the code.
Map the keys.
Grade the risk.
A read-only forensic review of EVM contracts: who controls them, which privileged functions they expose and what a controller could do to holders, with every finding ranked by severity and the contract graded A to F.
0x7f3a9c…a1c20- CRITICALController can pull tokens from wallets that approved this contract
- HIGHController can replace the contract logic
- HIGHController can move assets held by the contract
- HIGHController can mint new tokens
- MEDIUMController can switch trading or transfers off
| Role | Address |
|---|---|
| Owner | 0x9a3f…11fe |
| Proxy admin | 0x9a3f…11fe |
| Minter | 0x4c81…07e0 |
Automated findings are review leads for an investigator, not legal conclusions.
Every fact is fetched
at the time of the audit.
- Verified source from the explorer, Sourcify or Blockscout, or source you paste
- Your project’s code only; standard libraries are left out
- Unverified contracts: public functions decoded from the bytecode
- Networks with no RPC answer or no deployment record
- Non-EVM networks: chain-record review only
- Every source used is named at the foot of the report
What we look for,
and how serious it is.
transferFrom() on an address the caller chooses: anyone who approved the contract can be emptied.
Balances written directly, outside the normal transfer path.
A transfer check the owner can switch on for sells into the trading pair: the honeypot pattern.
An initialise function with no guard, so whoever calls it can make themselves owner.
selfdestruct, or delegatecall to a caller-supplied address, with no access check.
An independent buy-and-sell test could buy the token but not sell it.
Upgrade functions or a proxy admin that can swap the code after you read it.
Withdraw, rescue, sweep or emergency functions open to the controller.
New supply the controller can create; drops to medium when a cap is enforced.
Fee changes with no upper bound; drops to low when a bound is checked.
Blacklists, bot lists and freezes on individual addresses.
The contract can be made to call or delegatecall any target.
ETH sent before storage is updated, with no reentrancy guard.
An access check a malicious contract can borrow from the owner.
renounceOwnership() overridden so the owner is never actually removed.
No published source; the functions are decoded from the bytecode instead.
Not a token, yet it moves other people’s tokens or batches calls.
A powerful role held by an ordinary wallet, an EIP-7702 delegated wallet or a 1-of-n Safe.
Pause or trading toggles the controller can flip.
Max-transaction, max-wallet or cooldown settings that can block sells.
The swap router or pair can be pointed somewhere else.
A failed payment treated as success.
ecrecover() without a zero-address or replay check.
No lock among the liquidity holders, so it can be pulled at any time.
The build cannot be reproduced exactly from the pragma.
Where fees go can be changed; each recipient is a cash-out lead.
Inline assembly that writes storage or makes calls.
Each finding names the function, file and line where it was found, the guard on it and a next step. If ownership has been renounced and the contract cannot be upgraded, owner-only powers drop one level.
Who holds the keys,
read from the chain.
Each privileged role is matched to the address that holds it, and each address is identified as a single wallet, a Safe and its threshold, a timelock and its delay, or another contract. A single wallet behind a powerful role is a finding in itself.
0x7f…c20 · proxy0x9a…11fSingle wallet0x9a…11fSame wallet as the owner0x4c…7e0Safe · 3 of 50x9a…11fSingle wallet0x51…b02Transfer in progress0x2d…a93Timelock · 48hHere one wallet is owner, proxy admin and pauser, so a single key could upgrade, pause and drain.
From the contract
to the people behind it.
The audit lists every address worth tracing next and checks each one against public scam blocklists. When you keep the report, you choose which addresses to add to the case as leads.
- 1Deployer
Sent the creation transaction
0x3e…7d1 - 2Funded the deployer
First money into the deployer wallet
0xb2…40a - 3Implementation
The logic contract behind the proxy
0x88…c5e - 4Controllers
Owner, proxy admin and role holders
0x9a…11f - 5Safe signers
Each signer behind a multisig role
5 wallets - 6Largest holder
A wallet holding a large share of supply
0x6f…e19
One report,
ready for the case.
The A–F grade and score, the count of findings at each severity, and a few lines on who controls the contract and how.
Each finding has its severity, what it means, the code it came from and the next step to take.
Who controls it, every privileged function and its guard, the deployment record, the largest holders and the functions decoded from the bytecode.
What was read and from where, and anything that could not be checked.
From security
and legal teams.
Something else? Ask our team →
01Which chains are supported?
EVM networks. Everything is read live from the contract’s own network; other networks get the chain-record review only.
02What if the source code isn’t verified?
That is itself a high finding. The audit still disassembles the bytecode, names the public functions it can and lists the administrative ones, so you can see what the contract exposes.
03How is the grade worked out?
Each finding takes points off 100: 25 for critical, 12 for high, 5 for medium and 1 for low. Any critical finding caps the score at 39. A is 90 or more, then B 75, C 60, D 40, otherwise F.
04Is a finding proof that the contract was used to steal?
No. A finding shows what the code allows. Each one carries a next step, such as which events or transactions to pull, so an investigator can check whether it was actually used.
05Does this replace a security audit?
No. It is forensic review for incidents, integrations and investigations. For new code before launch, commission a formal audit.
06Does anything get saved without me?
No. The audit writes nothing until you keep it. Kept reports go to the case with their findings, controllers and leads; undecided ones are deleted after 72 hours.
Bring us the contract
and the address.
We’ll grade it, map who controls it and list the addresses to follow with you.
